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THE FALLACY AND FORTUITY OF
MOTOR VEHICLE HOMICIDE
The motor vehicle has been present in our society for only a
few decades, yet it has become an integral part of our way of life.
Not only has this invention become a valuable asset to the American
family, but it is also an indispensable item in nearly every busi-
ness operation. Unfortunately, these mechanical devices have given
rise to a hodge-podge of complex problems which are indeed diffi-
cult to remedy. The above-mentioned social utility is often momen-
tarily forgotten when one hears or reads an item of news relating to
a traffic tragedy in which a life has been taken. The solution to
this highway slaughter is seemingly in the distant future, as the
facts show that little progress has been made in the past.
It is undoubtedly true that carelessness and disregard for the
safety of others are contributing factors in a vast majority of fatal
accidents.' In order to stifle this deadly reckoning, various safety
committees plead with the public to better their driving habits, and
legislatures are constantly enacting various laws which designate
the standard of care which the driver must follow. Violations of
these prescribed standards usually warrant criminal punishment to
the guilty. This punishment is the most severe when the defend-
ant, in failing to comply with the required standards, causes the
death of another. The obvious conclusion is that the effectiveness
of the safety committees and the legislation is relatively slight in
view of the fact that the fatality rate is ever-increasing.
2
The purpose here is to make a detailed study of the criminal
sanctions which the several states impose upon the unfortunate
driver involved in a highway tragedy. Such an individual is prop-
' Numerous surveys may be found which prepare highway data for the
general public's information. The purpose of such reports is obviously
to instill in the American motorist the fact that good driving habits are
a necessity. In regard to the causes of traffic accidents in which a life
is taken, TRAVELER INS. Co., DEADLY RECKONING 4 (1961) offers the fol-
lowing statistics: 38.5% of the highway fatalities are attributable to
speeding; 22.5% from failure to yield the right of way; 13.5% from
reckless driving; and 8.3% from driving off the roadway. The remain-
ing deaths are attributable to such careless acts as driving on the wrong
side of the road, improper passing, and improper signaling.
2 Id. at 1: "The increase in injuries during 1960 was particularly stagger-
ing, up seven per cent over last year to a total of 3,078,000. More than
3,116,000 men, women, and children were injured or killed, a tremend-
ous human and economic loss that should cause a great nation like ours
to bow its head in shame."
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erly described as "unfortunate" in view of the fact that thousands
of other drivers have, and exercise, driving habits comparable to
those of the defendant. Often the only distinguishing factor be-
tween a defendant and others who are of equal culpability3 is
the fact that the former, because of fortuitous 4 circumstances, has
become involved in a fatal accident. To "remedy" the problem,
courts imprison the individual who, for all practical purposes, is
quite often an upstanding citizen of the community. The taking of
his freedom is particularly harsh in those instances where the stat-
utes require only ordinary negligence for a conviction to be sus-
tained. This "remedy" solves nothing, as will be explained at the
conclusion of this article.
I. HISTORY
The courts were confronted with a new type of litigation soon
after the invention of the automobile. Not only were civil actions
deemed appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for property dam-
age and personal injuries sustained as a result of the defendant's
negligence, but criminal sanctions were also deemed necessary to
punish the driver when his conduct caused a death. The earlier
cases arose at a time when there was no legislation specifically pro-
viding for such a situation, and this new crime had to be cata-
gorized under an already existing criminal sanction. Except in
the rare instances where the defendant had used his automobile
as a weapon to intentionally and maliciously kill his victim,5 or
where the defendant's act was so wilful and wanton 6 as to justify
3 "Culpability" as used in this article refers to the negligent manner in
which the driver operates his vehicle. For example, two drivers would
be "equally culpable" if each drove his respective vehicle in the same
unlawful manner, such as traveling at a speed greater than that pro-
vided by law.
4 "Fortuitous" as used in this article refers to those surrounding circum-
stances which happen by chance or accident. It is certainly "by chance"
that the speeder is involved in a fatal accident in view of the fact that a
great percentage of his fellow-drivers are guilty of the same act but
reach their destinations without incident.
5 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 971 (1957): "If the defendant
acts with malice aforethought and with such state of mind strikes an-
other with his automobile thereby causing the death of the latter, the
offense is murder, the same as if any other instrument of destruction
had been employed with like mental state." See, e.g., People v. Brown,
53 Cal. App. 664, 200 Pac. 727 (Dist. Ct. 1921).
6 In discussing wilful and wanton operation of the motor vehicle, the
court in Berness v. State, 38 Ala. App. 1, 3, 83 So. 2d 607, 609 (1953),
af'd, 263 Ala. 641, 83 So. 2d 613 (1955) stated: "It is well settled under
our decisions that where the accused is himself the driver of an automo-
bile and drives it in a manner greatly dangerous to the lives of others so
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a conviction for murder, the prosecutor reverted to the "catch-all"
crime of manslaughter to obtain a conviction.7 In those states which
recognized degrees of this "most elastic of all crimes," the driver
was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter; 9 of course, the
requisite conditions could have been present to justify a convic-
tion for voluntary manslaughter.10
The Nebraska Supreme Court was first confronted with a high-
way homicide case in 1911 in Schultz v. State." In affirming a
as to evidence a depraved mind regardless of human life, he may be
guilty of murder in the second degree if his anti-social acts result in the
death of another, and this though he had no preconceived purpose to de-
prive any particular human being of life." Accord, Powell v. State,
193 Ga. 398, 19 S.E.2d 678 (1942); State v. Trott, 190 N.C. 674, 130 S.E.
627 (1925); Owen v. State, 188 Tenn. 459, 221 S.W.2d 515 (1949);
McCarthy v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 149, 218 S.W.2d 190 (1949); Summons
v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 448, 169 S.W.2d 171 (1943).
7 Generally, common-law manslaughter is described as an unlawful
homicide, without express or implied malice. I WHARTON, CRnVmAL
LAw & PROCEDURE § 271 (1957). Involuntary manslaughter constitutes
the killing of a human being either by (1) the consequences of an un-
lawful act, or (2) the doing of a lawful act in an unlawful manner.
PERKINS, CanvnqAL LAw 56 (1957) gives the following description of
involuntary manslaughter: "And since manslaughter itself is a 'catch-
all' concept, including as a matter of common law all homicide not
amounting to murder on the one hand and not legally justifiable or
excusable on the other, the general outline of involuntary manslaughter
is very simple. Every unintentional killing of a human being is in-
voluntary manslaughter if it is neither murder nor voluntary man-
slaughter nor within the scope of some recognized justification of ex-
cuse."
8 KENNY, OuTLmNEs oF CanvnAL LAW 141 (15th ed. 1936).
9 A case in which the court was met with the problem of highway homi-
cide for the first time was Held v. Commonwealth, 183 Ky. 209, 208
S.W. 772 (1919). In utilizing the crime of involuntary manslaughter,
the court stated: "This is the first case that has reached this court,
involving criminal liability for homicide resulting from the operation
of the automobile, but the principles of law involved are thoroughly
settled in this jurisdiction, and there can be no doubt that under the
decisions of this court, carelessness or negligence or recklessness in
the performance of a lawful act, which results in the death of another,
is always unlawful and criminal if the agency employed was at a time
and place of a character that its negligent or reckless use was neces-
sarily dangerous to human life or limb or property ... " Id. at 213,
208 S.W. at 774.
10 A simple example would be the case where the defendant, with ade-
quate provocation and during the heat of passion, used his vehicle to
kill his enemy.
11 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-403 (Reissue 1956) provides that: "Whoever
shall unlawfully kill another without malice, either upon a sudden
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conviction under the manslaughter statute,12 the court stated that
the social utility of the automobile is not to be overlooked, nor
is its reasonable use to be restricted; however, criminal sanctions
should be imposed on a motorist when his carelessness causes a
death. Thus, the Nebraska court followed the great weight of au-
thority which considered imprisonment of inadvertent drivers to
be the solution to the problem. Such an attitude has not yet
changed. In fact, the legislatures soon began to take the position
that not enough "criminals" were being convicted because of the
nature of the crime of manslaughter. 13 To remedy this situation, a
majority of the states have enacted various laws specifically cov-
ering death caused by highway carelessness.
Nebraska was an early leader in this area when its first statute
specifically covering such a crime was enacted in 1919,14 only a
few years after the decision in Schultz. This statute remained in
force until 1935 when an amendment was added providing a pen-
alty for causing the death of another when driving while under the
influence of an intoxicating liquor.' 5 The Nebraska Supreme
quarrel, or unintentionally while the slayer is in the commission of
some unlawful act, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter; and upon
conviction thereof shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more
than ten years nor less than one year."
12 NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-403 (Reissue 1956) provides that: 'Whoever shall
unlawfully kill another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel,
or unintentionally, while the slayer is in the commission of some un-
lawful act, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter; and upon con-
viction thereof shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than
ten years nor less than one year."
13 One writer described the situation as follows: "Juries are frequently
unwilling to condemn as a felon one who is guilty only of some act of
negligence even though that act has resulted in the death of another.
It has been said that the term 'manslaughter' imports a degree of
brutality which jurors do not care to place upon a merely negligent
driver. Moreover, the penalty in manslaughter cases is often greater
than that which jurors feel is warranted in auto death cases. The ob-
stacles to manslaughter convictions appear not only at the trial stage
but also at the appellate level. The judges themselves exhibit a good
deal of reluctance in auto death manslaughter convictions." Karaba,
Negligent Homicide or Manslaughter: A Dilemma, 41 J. Canvi. L.,
C. & P.S. 183 (1951).
14 "[I]f any person operating a motor vehicle in violation of the provi-
sions of this act shall by so doing seriously, maim or disfigure any
person, or cause the death of any person, or persons he shall, upon
conviction thereof be fined not less than two hundred dollars nor
more than five hundred dollars, or be imprisoned in the penitentiary
for not less than one year or more than ten years." Neb. Laws c. 222,
§ 32 (1919).
15 Neb. Laws c. 134, § 2 (1935).
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Court never based a decision on this statute even though it had the
opportunity to do So.1 6 The legislature repealed the negligent homi-
cide portion of the Motor Vehicle Act in 1937,17 and no further
action was taken until 1949 when the present statute was passed
making motor vehicle homicide a crime.1 8
Today, the driver of a death vehicle is by no means punished
in a uniform manner throughout the United States. Although
their purposes are the same, a search of the different state statutes
and the cases arising thereunder reveals that convictions may be
had for: manslaughter by automobile;' 9 negligent homicide; 20
reckless homicide; 21 homicide by criminal negligence;2 2 negligent
operation of a motor vehicle,23 and driving so as to endanger, re-
sulting in death.2 4 Several states do not have a specific statute
covering death by automobile and thus still convict under man-
slaughter provisions.25 An examination of these various classifica-
tions will be made in the following section. The most difficult
problem confronting a court construing one of these statutes is the
16 The first case to come before the Nebraska Supreme Court after the
passing of the negligent homicide statute was Crawford v. State, 116
Neb. 125, 216 N.W. 294 (1927). The court said that Crawford was not
entitled to an instruction under the provisions of the negligent homi-
cide statute because one of his alleged "unlawful acts" (driving on
the wrong side of the road) was not embodied in the Motor Vehicle
Act. The next case to come before the court was Benton v. State,
124 Neb. 485, 247 N.W. 21 (1933) in which the defendant was charged
with drunken driving and speeding, both violations of the Motor Ve-
hicle Act. The court did not mention the negligent homicide statute
in the opinion and based the decision solely on the manslaughter pro-
visions.
17 Neb. Laws c. 140, § 1 (1937).
Is NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-403.01 (Reissue 1956) provides: "Whoever shall
cause the death of another without malice while engaged in the unlaw-
ful operation of a motor vehicle shall be guilty of a crime to be known
as a motor vehicle homicide and, upon conviction thereof, shall be (1)
fined in a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, (2) imprisoned in
the county jail for not to exceed six months, (3) imprisoned in the
penitentiary for a period not less than one year nor more than ten
years, or (4) both such fine and imprisonment."
19 People v. Markham, 153 Cal. App. 2d 260, 314 P.2d 217 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957).
20 State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960).
21 People v. Potter, 5 Ill. 2d 265, 125 N.E.2d 510 (1955).
22 People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1956).
23 Casey v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1958).
24 R.I. GEN. LAws ANw. § 31-27-1 (1956).
25 State v. McLaughlin, 250 Iowa 435, 94 N.W.2d 303 (1959).
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determination of the degree of negligence which is required to sus-
tain a conviction.
II. DEGREE OF CULPABILITY REQUIRED BEFORE A
DRIVER CAN BE CONVICTED
A. WHERE THE MANSLAUGHTER STATUTE MUST BE USED
In those states which are still without specific motor vehicle
homicide statutes, and manslaughter statutes are thus utilized, it is
established that ordinary negligence is insufficient to sustain a con-
viction. In certain instances, the statute specifically designates the
degree of negligence which is required. Thus, statutory require-
ments are couched in such terms as "culpable negligence," 26 or
"aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless. ' 27 Where the statutes are
silent as to the degree of culpability, 28 case law indicates that more
than ordinary negligence is mandatory. The Colorado Supreme
Court recently stated: 29
It is clear that before defendant could be convicted of man-
slaughter, there must have been evidence tending to prove that
he recklessly and wantonly failed to exercise the care and
caution that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised
under similar circumstances, and that his conduct was such as to
indicate a reckless and wanton disregard for the safety of others.
Ordinary or simple negligence is not sufficient to sustain a charge
of involuntary manslaughter.
Such a conclusion is substantiated by the foremost authorities in
criminal law.30
26 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.07 (1941). For cases interpreting this
statute, see Penton v. State, 114 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1959); Henderson v.
State, 90 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1956); Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So. 2d
671 (1941); Pitts v. State, 132 Fla. 812, 182 So. 234 (1938); Franklin v.
State, 120 Fla. 686, 163 So. 55 (1935).
27 See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-2507 (1947). For cases inter-
preting this statute, see State v. Bast, 116 Mont. 329, 151 P.2d 1009
(1944); State v. Powell, 114 Mont. 571, 138 P.2d 949 (1943).
28 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 320 (1958); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-7
(1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1009 (1953); IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.10
(1950); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13 (1959); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4511.18 (Page 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4703 (1945).
29 Trujillo v. People, 133 Colo. 186, 189, 292 P.2d 980, 982 (1956).
30 "In order to avoid the harshness of imposing a criminal penalty for
manslaughter upon the driver who was merely negligent, the rule has
developed by decision or statute that the defendant must be guilty of
culpable or gross negligence or recklessness in order to constitute the
offense of manslaughter by automobile. Under such a principle the
proof of merely that degree of negligence which would entitle a plain-
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Several states have set out the required culpability in their
statutes in such a manner that a fair reading discloses very little.
Such statutes require either of the following before a conviction will
stand: the death must be caused by (a) a lawful act performed in
an unlawful manner with gross negligence, or (b) an unlawful act.
Clearly, ordinary negligence will not suffice for (a), but a more
difficult problem arises in regard to (b). The Utah Supreme Court,
in a detailed discussion, came to a conclusion which is the near-
unanimous view: 31
We think the "unlawful act", that is, the infraction, must be done
in such a manner as to more than constitute a mere thoughtless
omission or slight deviation from the norm of prudent conduct. It
must be reckless or in marked disregard for the safety of others.
Thus, the driver's conduct must be of a flagrant nature before he
may be imprisoned for manslaughter.
Let us now turn to the special motor vehicle homicide statutes
which were enacted for the aid of the prosecution. As will be
shown, a few jurisdictions authorize convictions where the culpa-
bility of the driver is equal to a degree of negligence which formerly
had been actionable only in civil cases. One thing that should be
noticed is that the existence of such enactments does not neces-
sarily rule out convictions under applicable manslaughter provi-
sions. Some states allow instructions under either crime,32 where-
as other jurisdictions have repealed the manslaughter statute in
so far as it pertains to homicide by motorists.38
tiff to recover damages in a civil action is insufficient as a basis for
criminal liability." 3 WHARTON, CRInINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 972
(1957).
31 State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 197, 91 P.2d 457, 466 (1939).
32 D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-607 (1961) provides: "The crime of negligent
homicide defined in section 40-606 shall be deemed to be included
within every crime of manslaughter charged to have been committed
in the operation of any vehicle, and in any case where a defendant is
charged with manslaughter committed in the operation of any vehicle,
if the jury shall find the defendant not guilty of the crime of man-
slaughter such jury may, in its discretion, render a verdict of guilty
of negligent homicide." See also Phillips v. State, 204 Ark. 205, 161
S.W.2d 747 (1942); State v. Gloyd, 148 ian. 706, 84 P.2d 966 (1938).
33 State v. Marf, 80 Ariz. 220, 295 P.2d 842 (1956) (the negligent homi-
cide statute in question was later repealed); State v. Davidson, 78
Idaho 553, 309 P.2d 211 (1957).
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B. MOTOR VEHICLE HOmICIDE PROVISIONS INCORPORATED
INTO THE MANSLAUGHTER STATUTE
Alaska,3 4 California,35 Maryland 36 and Arizona37 have specific
provisions in their manslaughter statutes relating to deaths caused
by motor vehicles. The unusual fact of these acts is that the tra-
ditional manslaughter requirement of reckless conduct is not al-
ways present. However, the Alaska statute specifically requires
"culpable negligence" although there have been no reported cases
arising under this specific provision.38 The Maryland statute des-
ignates the required degree of negligence by adopting the common-
law standard of "gross negligence. '3 9
The Arizona and California provisions are nearly verbatim.
To exemplify this approach of punishing the guilty party, the Cali-
fornia statute provides for fine and imprisonment if the driver
causes the death of another while: 40
(a). In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to felony, with gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful
act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with
gross negligence.
(b). In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to felony, without gross negligence; or in the commission of a law-
ful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but
without gross negligence.
In both states, the penal provisions vary with the degree of cul-
pability.41 In these two states, ordinary negligence will suffice as
to subsection (b), with the legislatures providing for a partial
alleviation of the harshness by establishing a lesser penalty than
that which is given when the defendant violates subsection (a).
However, it should be noted that there are still instances where
the defendant will lose his freedom even though he has been guilty
of only ordinary negligence.
34 ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 64-5-8 (1949).
35 CAL. PEN. CODE § 192.
36 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 388 (1957).
37 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-456 (Supp. 1961).
38 ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 64-4-4 (1949) provides that the guilty
motorist may be imprisoned for a period of twenty years!
39 Faulcon v. State, 211 Md. 249, 126 A.2d 858 (1956). Accord, Connor v.
State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960); Johnson v. State, 213 Md. 527,
132 A.2d 853 (1957).
40 CAL. PEN. CODE § 192.
41 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-457 (Supp. 1961); CAL. PEN. CODE § 193.
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C. THE NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE STATUTE
The majority of the special enactments which deal with death
on the highways may be classified as "negligent homicide" statutes.
Some fourteen states have chosen this method of punishing the
individual who fortuitously takes another's life on the public streets.
A survey of these statutes reveals that the degree of negligence
which is needed for a conviction is usually specifically stated in the
act. Seven states have the phrase "reckless disregard of the safety
of others" embodied in their legislation.4 2 The recent case of State
v. Berchtold,43 exemplifies the typical judicial attitude in interpret-
ing such statutory standards. In affirming the defendant's con-
viction, the court stated: 44
Our statute only requires reckless disregard for the safety of
others, which is a much greater lack of care than ordinary negli-
gence, but does not require as great a consciousness of the danger
confronted as wilful misconduct required to create civil liability
under our guest statute. To be "reckless" does not require "wil-
fulness" but means rather heedless, careless, or rash inadvertence
to consequences. Recklessness may include wilfulness. It requires
more than negligence, but a person may be reckless without being
wilful. Recklessness indicates indifference and utter disregard for
consequences and is not mere inadvertence nor error in judgment.
The remainder of the negligent homicide statutes contain lan-
guage requiring a degree of culpability ranging from gross 4 5 to ordi-
42 Oklahoma offers a typical example of such a statute. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 47, § 11-903 (1961): "(a) When the death of any person ensues
within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the driv-
ing of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the
person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide."
The following statutes contain very similar language: ARK. STAT.
§ 75-1001 (1957); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 49-1101 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12-27-35 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-43 (Supp. 1961);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1721(330) (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-232
(1957).
43 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960).
44 Id. at 214, 357 P.2d at 187. (Footnotes omitted.)
45 ORE. REv. STAT. § 163.091 (1961) provides: 'When the death of any
person ensues within one year as the proximate result of injuries
caused by:
(1) The driving of any motor vehicle or combination of motor
vehicles in a grossly negligent manner; or
(2) The driving of a vehicle or combination of vehicles which is
known or should have been known by the driver to be defectively
equipped; or
(3) The driving of a vehicle or combination of vehicles which is
known or should have been known by the driver to be defectively
loaded ....
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nary46 negligence. Notwithstanding the fact that penalties are not
usually as severe where ordinary negligence is the standard,47 the
imposition of criminal sanctions under such a set of facts is a rather
barbaric treatment of the problem. Is it fair to impose penal sanc-
tions on a driver where criminal negligence is lacking?48 It is
submitted that it is not. An example of such treatment is afforded
by the District of Columbia case of Sanderson v. United States,49
where the defendant failed to yield the right of way to a pedestrian.
In affirming the conviction, the court stated: 50
The independent testimony established, at least circumstantially,
that the lady was in the crosswalk when she was struck and that
she was hurled or pushed some twenty feet. These circum-
stances, considered alone, bespoke negligence. Considered to-
gether with defendant's admission, they more than met the tests
prescribed by the Supreme Court and authorized an inference by
the judge as trier of the facts that defendant was negligent.
Clearly the judge was justified in finding defendant negligent by
ordinary and usual standards of care.
After an analysis of the various negligent homicide statutes, it
is apparent that in some states ordinary negligence is sufficient for
the conviction and imprisonment of a driver.
D. RECKLESS HOMICIDE STATUTES
Four states, Illinois,51 Indiana, 52 Maine53 and South Carolina5
4
punish their "highway killers" by convictions under a crime known
as "reckless homicide." Each of the pertinent statutes set out the
46 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 14-218 (1958) ("negligent operation of
a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state"); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 40-606 (1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-529 (1949) ("negligent
disregard of the safety of others").
47 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 14-218 (1958) (a maximum of $500 and/or
six months in jail); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-606 (1961) (maximum
$1,000 and/or one year in jail); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-529 (1949)
(maximum $500 fine and/or one year incarceration).
48 A person is guilty of "criminal negligence" when he does some act or
omits some duty under circumstances showing an actual intent to in-
jure, or where the breach of duty is so flagrant as to warrant an im-
plication that the resulting injury was intended. Schultz v. State,
89 Neb. 34, 130 N.W. 972 (1911).
49 125 A.2d 70 (D.C. Munic. App. 1956).
50 Id. at 74. (Footnotes omitted.).
51 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 364a (1961).
52 IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2001 (1952).
53 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 22, § 151 B (Supp. 1961).
54 S.C. CODE § 46-341 (1952).
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degree of negligence needed as a prerequisite for a conviction.
The requirement is uniform that the driver's conduct amount to
a "reckless disregard for the safety of others." Such a crime is
essentially identical to the one in those states whose negligent homi-
cide statutes specify the same degree of culpability. 55 As under the
comparable negligent homicide acts, ordinary negligence is in-
sufficient to warrant a defendant's conviction.56
E. MISCELLANEOUS STATUTES
A study of the applicable statutes of the remaining states
reveals that there is no distinguishable pattern in which they may
be classified. 57 The statutory enactments of Minnesota,58 New
York,59 New Jersey,60 New Hampshire"' and Rhode Island62 all
contain language which establishes a degree of culpability similar
55 Supra note 42.
56 In People v. Potter, 5 Ill. 2d 365, 366, 125 N.E.2d 510, 511 (1955), the
court took the opportunity to define "reckless disregard" as follows:
"The phrase 'reckless disregard for the safety of others' as used in
this statute has a common-law definition of its own, descriptive
of the conduct constituting the crime. In general, one's conduct is in
reckless disregard of the safety of another if he intentionally does
an act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, know-
ing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable
man to realize that his conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability
that substantial harm will result to the other." (Citations omitted.)
Accord, People v. Garman, 411 Ill. 279, 103 N.E.2d 636 (1952); People
v. Janosk, 13 Ill. App. 2d 56, 140 N.E.2d 541, aff'd, 12 Ill. 2d 96, 145
N.E.2d 85 (1957); State v. Beckman, 219 Ind. 176, 37 N.E. 2d 530 (1941);
Turrell v. State, 221 Ind. 662, 51 N.E.2d 359 (1943); State v. McCracken,
211 S.C. 52, 43 S.E.2d 607 (1947).
57 Mnu . STAT. AxN. § 169.11 (1960) ("is guilty of criminal negligence in
the operation of a vehicle resulting in death"); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1053-a
("is guilty of criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting
in death"); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A-113-9 (1951) ("is guilty of a misde-
meanor"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. (no specific crime defined); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 31-27-1 (1956) ("shall be guilty of 'driving so as to en-
danger, resulting in death.' ")
58 MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 169-11 (1960) ("reckless or grossly negligent man-
ner").
59 N.Y. Pm. LAw § 1053-a ("reckless or culpably negligent manner").
60 N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A: 113-9 (1951) ("carelessly and heedlessly, in wilful
or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others").
61 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262.15 (1955) ("reckless operation of a motor
vehicle").
62 R.I. GEN. LAWS AN,. § 31-27-1 (1956) ("reckless disregard of the safety
of others").
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to the above-mentioned reckless homicide acts. Accordingly, the
cases which have been decided under these provisions have uni-
formly held that more than ordinary negligence is required for a
conviction.63 The same result has been reached under the Wiscon-
sin statute which requires "a high degree of negligence. '64 This
has been construed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to mean some-
thing "substantially" more than ordinary negligence.6 5
The Michigan66 and Vermont 67 statutes present another prob-
lem in determining the requisite degree of negligence. Both con-
tain the language "careless, reckless or negligent." The Michi-
gan court has utilized the word "or" in a disjunctive concept and
has thus sustained convictions when only ordinary negligence was
present. 8 Although the Vermont court has seemingly never ruled
63 The standard judicial approach is exemplified in People v. Ambrico, 12
N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (Kings County Ct. 1939): "[T]he negligence essential
to establish criminal liability must be something more than slight negli-
gence, which might be sufficient to support a civil action. The negli-
gence must be of such character as to show a disregard of the
consequences which may ensue from the act charged and an indiffer-
ence to the rights of others." Accord, State v. Homme, 226 Minn. 83, 32
N.W.2d 151 (1948); State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 21 N.W.2d 480
(1946); State v. Oliver, 37 N.J. Super. 379, 117 A.2d 404 (Super. Ct.
1955); In re Lewis, 11 N. J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953); People v. Decina,
2 N.Y. 2d 133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1956); People v. Eckert, 2
N.Y. 2d 126, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Ct. App. 156); People v. Bearden, 290
N.Y. 478, 49 N.E.2d 785 (1943), reversing 265 App. Div. 975, 39 N.Y.S.
2d 607 (2d Dep't 1942); People v. Brucato, 32 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Kings
County Ct. 1942); People v. Chalupka, 32 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Queens
County Ct. 1940).
64 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.08 (1958).
65 State ex rel. Zent v. Yanney, 244 Wis. 342, 12 N.W.2d 45 (1944): "It is
considered that the negligence requisite for a conviction ... is substan-
tially and appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence. It
is negligence of an aggravated character. It is great negligence. It is
conduct that not only creates unreasonable risk of bodily harm to an-
other, but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial
harm will result to such other person. In other words, the culpability
which characterizes all negligence is magnified to a higher degree as
compared with that present in ordinary negligence."
66 VICH. STAT. ANN. § 28-556 (1954).
67 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1182 (1958).
68 The Michigan court stated in People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 428, 212
N.W. 97, 99 (1927): "In this state under the common law, one is not
criminally responsible for death from negligence unless the negligence
is so great that the law can impute a criminal intent .... By the enact-
ment of this statute, the legislature of 1921 obviously intended to create
a lesser offense than involuntary manslaughter or common-law negli-
gent homicide, where the negligent killing was caused by the operation
of a vehicle .... [T]his statute was intended to apply only to cases
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on a homicide case arising under this statute, the court has held
that ordinary negligence will meet the culpability requirement.0 9
This interpretation was made in a case of careless driving which
is an included offense in the statute.
Kentucky, in a unique statute, provides for punishment if the
driver of a vehicle is guilty of only ordinary negligence where such
conduct causes the death of another. It provides: "Any person
who, by negligent operation of a motor vehicle, causes the death
of another, under circumstances not otherwise punishable as a
homicide, shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than
one year. '"0 The Kentucky court considered this statute in Casey
v. Commonwealth,71 where the defendant's manslaughter convic-
tion was overturned because only ordinary negligence was pres-
ent. In the course of the opinion the court stated: 7 2
Thereafter, in 1952, the Legislature enacted what is now KRS
435.025 defining an offense of negligent homicide by operation of
a motor vehicle, which is supplemental to voluntary and involun-
tary manslaughter. Since that time the law in cases of this kind
has classified such offenses into three categories, namely, (1)
voluntary manslaughter, based on recklessness and wantonness;
(2) involuntary manslaughter based on gross negligence; (3) the
statutory offense of negligent homicide, based on ordinary negli-
gence.
The remaining two states, Texas and Louisiana, have general
negligent homicide statutes which do not specifically mention motor
vehicles but such cases are prosecuted thereunder. Ordinary negli-
gence will definitely not suffice for a conviction under the Louisi-
ana statute73 as criminal negligence is a prerequisite. A conviction
under the Texas statutes may be either first74 or second 75 degree.
where the negligence is of a lesser degree than gross negligence....
[T]his basic idea of this statute is that everyone who places himself
in a situation where his acts may affect the safety of others must use
every reasonable precaution to guard against injuring them. If he does
not do so, and death ensues, he is guilty of negligent homicide under
the statute. It is a harsh statute, but finds justification in the serious
results that are liable to follow the negligent operation of automobiles
on extensively traveled streets and highways. The court did not err
... in instructing the jury that death resulting from ordinary negli-
gence constituted an offense under this statute.
69 State v. Labonte, 120 Vt. 465, 144 A.2d 792 (1958).
70 -Ky. REV. STAT. AwN. § 435.025 (1955).
71 313 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1958).
72 Id. at 278.
73 LA. REV. STAT. § 14.32 (1950).
74 TEx. PEN. CODE art. 1231 (1948).
75 Tsx. PEN. CODE art. 1238 (1948).
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A "first degree" violation is the lesser offense7 6 and a conviction will
be sustained if the defendant is guilty of "negligence and careless-
ness" while in the commission of a lawful act. In order for a con-
viction to stand in a prosecution for the more serious degree,"
there must be the commission of an "unlawful act" such as a mis-
demeanor or one which is not a penal offense, but which would
give rise to a civil action. From a fair reading of the language
employed in these statutes, it seems that Texas is another state
where a driver may be imprisoned when his culpability is equal
to only ordinary negligence.
F. SUMMARY
After a survey of the various criminal sanctions that may be
imposed upon the driver of a death vehicle, the degree of culpabil-
ity required may be summarized as follows:
A. Where Special Homicide Statutes are Lacking. In those
states which continue to utilize the manslaughter statute, ordinary
negligence will not suffice for a conviction.
B. Motor Vehicle Provision Incorporated into Manslaughter
Statute. Of those states which have a provision in their man-
slaughter statutes relating to motor vehicle homicide, only Arizona
and California allow, at reduced penalties, convictions for ordinary
negligence.
C. Negligent Homicide. In those states which have the crime
of "negligent homicide," some require that only ordinary negligence
need be shown by the State.
D. Reckless Homicide. In those states which provide for the
crime of "reckless homicide," ordinary negligence will never be
deemed sufficient for a conviction.
E. Miscellaneous Statutes. Of the remaining states, there
are instances in which gross negligence or reckless conduct is not
a requirement of the crime.
76 TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1237 (1948) ("confinement in jail not exceeding
one year, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars").
77 TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1242 (1948) provides: "When the unlawful act
attempted or executed is known as a misdemeanor, the punishment
of negligent homicide committed in the execution of such unlawful
act shall be imprisonment in jail not exceeding three years, or by fine
not exceeding three thousand dollars." TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1243
(1948) provides: "If the act intended is one for which an action would
lie, but not an offense against the penal law, the homicide resulting
therefrom is a misdemeanor, and may be punished by fine not exceed-
ing one thousand dollars, and by imprisonment in jail not exceeding
one year."
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III. THE NEBRASKA POSITION
A. MANSLAUGHTER
The special statute which the legislature of this state enacted
in 1949 defines a crime known as motor vehicle homicide and is
the only one of its kind in the fifty states or the District of Colum-
bia. It provides: 7s
Whoever shall cause the death of another without malice while
engaged in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle shall be
guilty of a crime to be known as motor vehicle homicide and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be (1) fined in a sum not exceeding
five hundred dollars, (2) imprisoned in the county jail for not to
exceed six months, (3) imprisoned in the penitentiary for a period
not less than one year nor more than ten years, or (4) both such
fine and imprisonment.
By an inspection of this statute, it is noticed that the words "un-
lawful operation" create the culpability standard rather than the
traditional method of designating the driver's conduct which is to
be punishable. It is also to be noticed that there is a choice as to
the length of time which the defendant may be imprisoned. Seem-
ingly, it is within the judge's discretion whether the driver of a
death vehicle is to be sentenced to six months (maximum) in the
county jail or to ten years (maximum) in the penitentiary.
Before reviewing the judicial interpretation of the Motor Ve-
hicle Homicide Act, cognizance must first be taken of the man-
slaughter statute which provides: 79
Whoever shall unlawfully kill another without malice, either
upon a sudden quarrel, or unintentionally, while the slayer
is in the commission of some unlawful act, shall be deemed guilty
of manslaughter; and upon conviction thereof shall be imprisoned
in the penitentiary not more than ten years nor less than one year.
As was pointed out previously, the early cases involving the motor
vehicle were based on this statute. Now that Nebraska has enacted
specific legislation covering death caused by the unlawful operation
of a motor vehicle, the question arises whether or not prosecutions
in this area may still be based on the manslaughter statute. The
Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the possibility of partial repeal
in Birdsley v. State,8 0 when it stated that motor vehicle homicide
is a crime in amelioration of manslaughter.
Since there is a possibility that the Nebraska driver can yet
be convicted of manslaughter, an examination of its culpability
78 NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-403.01 (Reissue 1956). (Emphasis added.)
79 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-403 (Reissue 1956). (Emphasis added.)
80 161 Neb. 581, 587, 74 N.W.2d 377, 381 (1956).
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requirement is warranted. The early case of Stehr v. State,8 1 al-
though not involving a motor vehicle, affords a starting point. The
facts show that the defendant was convicted of manslaughter after
he had allowed his grandson to freeze to death. The defendant
allowed the stove to burn out and refused to refuel it notwithstand-
ing the fact that adequate coal was available. In affirming the con-
viction, the court stated: 82
His own testimony shows that for ten or eleven days he saw the
child's feet turn from gray to purple, from blue to green and
black, and saw its flesh rotting and dropping away, yet made no
effort to procure medical aid until the odor of the rotting flesh
became unbearable .... The degree of negligence in such a case
that would make a man criminally responsible can hardly be
defined. It is not a slight failure in duty that would render him
criminally negligent, but a great failure of duty undoubtedly
would .... As we view the evidence, the jury had a sufficient
basis for finding the defendant guilty of such criminal negligence
as would amount to manslaughter.
Thus, it is observed that the court considered the degree of negli-
gence as the important criterion in convicting the defendant, rather
than expounding upon the "unlawful act" concept. The conclu-
sion that the Nebraska court required criminal negligence is forti-
fied by Thiede v. State. 3 The defendant had brewed an intoxicat-
ing liquor which had caused another's death from alcoholic poison-
ing. The court stated: 8 4
We believe the rule to be that, though the act, made unlawful by
statute, is an act merely malum prohibitum and is ordinarily in-
sufficient, still, when such an act is accompanied by negligence
or further wrong, so as to be, in its nature, dangerous, or so as to
manifest a reckless disregard for the safety of others, then it may
be sufficient to supply the wrongful intent essential to criminal
homicide, and, when such act results in the death of another, may
constitute involuntary manslaughter.
Accordingly, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded
because the trial court had failed to instruct upon the question of
"recklessness."
Keeping in mind the principle, as gathered by these cases, that
ordinary negligence is insufficient, a consideration must now be
made of the manslaughter convictions involving a motor vehicle.
The following language in the first automobile case is to the effect
that the required degree of negligence must equal recklessness: 85
81 92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 676 (1913).
82 Id. at 759, 139 N.W. at 677 (1913). (Emphasis added.)
83 106 Neb. 48, 182 N.W. 570 (1913).
84 Id. at 53, 182 N.W. at 572. (Emphasis added.)
85 Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, 46, 130 N. W. 972, 977 (1911).
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Negligence is the gist of the offense, and, in the absence of reck-
lessness or of want of due caution, there is no criminal liability.
Actual intent is not an essential element of the offense. It is
enough if there is shown a neglect and reckless indifference of
the lives and safety of others. The evidence contained in the
rcord [sic] conclusively established a case of negligent and reck-
less indifference to the lives and safety of others on the part of
the defendant sufficient to sustain his conviction ....
The requirement of recklessness established by the earlier
decisions was followed in the next few cases. In Crawford v.
State,8 6 the court held that an instruction couched in the terms
"unlawful, reckless, careless, and negligent manner" adequately
described the necessary culpability. As late as 1942, in Cowan v.
State,87 the court held:
Our conclusion is that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the find-
ing of the jury that plaintiff in error was guilty of such gross neg-
ligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of human life. Such neg-
ligence is criminal in its character and where it results in a death
will sustain a conviction for manslaughter.
The Cowan case was the last to conform with the requirement
that there must be a degree of culpability greater than ordinary
negligence if a conviction was to be sustained. The cases which
followed seemed to establish a new criteria for determining the
guilt of a driver. The emphasis moved to the "unlawful act" clause
of the statute. The change in position was based on language found
in the earlier case of Benton v. State 88 which held that if one drives
an automobile in violation of a law which pertains to the operation
of such vehicles, and if this violation is the cause of another's death,
the individual is guilty of manslaughter.
An analysis of this language would warrant the conclusion
that any violation, no matter how slight, of a law "pertaining to
the operation of such vehicles" would justify a manslaughter con-
viction including the possibility of a ten-year prison term for the
defendant.8 9 Such a conclusion was seemingly reached by the
court in Schluter v. State,90 the last of the motor vehicle cases prose-
cuted under the manslaughter statute:
86 116 Neb. 125, 216 N.W. 294 (1927).
87 140 Neb. 837, 843, 2 N.W.2d 111, 114 (1942).
88 124 Neb. 485, 488, 257 N.W. 21, 23 (1933).
89 The Nebraska Supreme Court has, on one occasion, stated that cer-
tain "unlawful" acts would not give rise to a conviction under the
Motor Vehicle Homicide Act. The example given was failure to have
a drivers license. Id. at 489, 257 N.W. at 23. It should be noted that
this act would not be the cause of another's death.
90 153 Neb. 317, 321, 44 N.W.2d 588, 591 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
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The failure of the court to advise the jury as proposed by the
defendant to the effect that before the jury could convict him
it must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at
the time the deceased came to his death "the defendant was guilty
of such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of
human life" is challenged as being prejudicial. This introduced an
element not heretofore recognized in this state as a prerequisite for
conviction of the crime of manslaughter.
In the light of the previous cases discussed, can it be said that gross
or reckless conduct was not a prerequisite for a conviction? The
court went on to rationalize its position by stating: 91
The operation of motor vehicles is governed by many legal restric-
tions and requirements which are designed and intended to secure
reasonable safety of persons upon the highways of the state. They
were adopted because experience had established that a disregard
thereof was likely to result in serious bodily harm or death. It
has been considered in this state that a negligent violation of any
of these by the operator of a motor vehicle on a public highway
directly resulting in death of another person may render the
operator guilty of manslaughter.
As the language "negligent violation" became the standard adopted
by the court it seems clear that the degree of this negligence was
immaterial with the entire emphasis being on the fact that there
was an "unlawful act" of a vehicle involved. 92 The Schluter case
also pointed out that a mere speeding violation would warrant
a conviction: 93
When a person drives a vehicle upon a public thoroughfare at a
speed greater than is reasonable and prudent, and in excess of a
speed allowed by law for that location, and the death of another is
caused as a result of the violation, the driver of the vehicle is
guilty of manslaughter.
The Nebraska position on manslaughter is definitely opposed
to that of the great majority of the American jurisdictions. 94 Such
a result is extremely harsh as nearly every traffic accident involv-
ing a fatality is attributable to the "unlawful operation" of a motor
vehicle. The Nebraska motorist can only hope that one of his
momentary inadvertencies will not cause the death of another,
or that the county attorneys will continue their benevolent attitude
and elect to prosecute only when the negligence is of an extreme
nature.95
91 Id. at 321, 44 N.W.2d at 591. (Emphasis added.)
92 Supra note 90.
93 Schluter v. State, 153 Neb. 317, 325, 44 N.W.2d 588, 593 (1950) (dic-
tum).
94 Supra note 30.
95 A reading of the cases discloses that the motorist is prosecuted only
when his negligence is of a flagrant nature.
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B. MOTOR VEHICLE HoMICIDE
The history and effect of the motor vehicle homicide statute
is neither as long nor as ambiguous as the manslaughter enactment.
However, the result is the same-simple negligence will suffice.
The first case of any significance 96 was Birdsley v. State.97 Defend-
ant was speeding at night, apparently on the wrong side of the
road. In affirming the conviction, the court stated: 98
Likewise... we conclude that in a prosecution for motor vehicle
homicide under the provisions of section 28-403.01, R.S. Supp.,
1953, it is simply required that the unlawful operation of the motor
vehicle by the accused shall be a proximate cause of the death
of another.
This was the case which laid the groundwork for ruling out gross
negligence or reckless conduct as a prerequisite for a conviction.
Like the earlier manslaughter cases, the entire emphasis was placed
upon the fact that there had been an "unlawful operation." Negli-
gence, according to the court, is not even an element of the offense.
The court specifically ruled out gross negligence in a motor vehicle
homicide case in Hoffman v. State when it stated: 99
While of course the requirement of the instructions that there
was a burden on the state to show gross negligence can have no
determining significance in this case, since the verdict was one of
guilty, it appears that attention should be called to the fact that
this phase of the instructions was erroneous and should not have
been submitted. The law exacts no such requirement in cases
such as this.
This position was substantiated in Prybil v. State:100
This court made it clear.., that negligence or gross negligence as
such is not an element of the crime of motor vehicle homicide.
There must be proof of unlawful operation. Negligence may be
and usually is a basic element in unlawful operation and may be
proved but the essential element of the crime as declared by
statute is the unlawful act.
Simply stated, the requirements for a conviction under the Ne-
braska motor vehicle homicide statute are: (1) death of a person,
(2) without malice, (3) while in the unlawful operation of a motor
vehicle.' 0 '
96 Earlier cases, which are of no consequence in relation to this article
are Birdsley v. Kelly, 159 Neb. 74, 65 N.W.2d 328 (1954), and Vore v.
State, 158 Neb. 233, 62 N.W.2d 871 (1954).
97 161 Neb. 581, 74 N.W.2d 377 (1956).
98 Id. at 588, 74 N.W.2d at 381.
99 162 Neb. 806, 814, 77 N.W.2d 592, 597 (1956).
100 165 Neb. 691, 703, 87 N.W.2d 201, 210 (1957).
101 Olney v. State, 169 Neb. 717, 100 N.W.2d 838 (1960).
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The harshness of this law is equal to the manslaughter inter-
pretation and need not be reiterated. The question which we must
now consider is the wisdom of such punishment. Does the convic-
tion of the driver solve any of the problems in any respect?
IV. THE FALLACY OF CONVICTING THE UNFORTUNATE
DRIVER-AND A PROPOSAL
The various methods of punishing the "criminal behind the
wheel" having been examined, an inspection of the wisdom of such
action seems appropriate. To create a hypothetical situation, sup-
pose A and B meet at the local country club and, upon their depar-
ture, each decides to drive his own car. En route to their respect-
ive destinations, both drive in excess of the speed limit and the
following events occur: (1) X runs a stop sign, resulting in a
collision with A-soon after, X dies; (2) B is arrested by a patrol-
man for speeding. After the applicable criminal sanctions are
imposed, A finds himself faced with a long prison sentence and a
heavy fine.10 2 B is assessed a nominal fine. The drivers were
equally "culpable," since the same "unlawful act" was committed,
yet the penal measures are of great divergence. Is it fair to place
such rigid penal provisions upon one individual in view of the fact
that daily hundreds are guilty of doing the same act (speeding) and
given a much lighter punishment? Motor vehicle homicide is indeed
a "fortuitous crime.' 103Not a single objective will be accomplished if the present
system of punishment is continued as no progress will be made to-
ward the stifling of the bad driving habits which are the cause of
thousands of deaths annually. The present method of imprison-
ment has had no success in the past and there is certainly no rea-
son to anticipate it will change in the future. As one is speeding
down a highway, the thought most remote in his mind is the possi-
bility of someone being killed by his conduct. The one thing upon
which this guilty speeder does reflect is the possibility of a "radar
trap" or a patrolman lurking about, waiting to pursue a violator.
The more rigid the penalties for the various moving violations, the
more careful our drivers will be!
Just as imprisonment does nothing to deter the conduct of
others, it has no constructive effect on the convicted. Our finest
102 "Uniformly the courts have said a man will not be excused for killing
another even though his victim was negligent. While contributory
negligence is a complete defense to an action for private injury re-
sulting from homicide, it is no defense for a public wrong." Schultz v.
State, 89 Neb. 34, 41, 130 N.W. 972, 975 (1911).
103 Supra note 4.
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citizens drive on the highways and are, at times, guilty of traffic
infractions. When such an infraction results in the death of another,
a jail sentence is not needed for them to realize their wrong. They
did not mean to kill the first time, and the resulting mental torture
from feeling they took another's life will more than insure that their
driving habits will be corrected in the future.
It is submitted that our legislature should repeal the motor
vehicle homicide act and the manslaughter provisions in so far as
they relate to the careless motorist, and in their stead establish
stricter penal sanctions for violations of the traffic regulations.
These penalties should be so severe that the possibility of com-
mitting a moving violation is kept foremost in the driver's mind.
The details of such penalties would necessarily have to be worked
out under legislative supervision, but such regulations are manda-
tory if anything is to be done about the three million who are
annually killed or injured. Heavy fines may be the answer to
some degree, but the problem arises here in that the brunt of the
punishment always falls on the bread-winner of the family and
thus may not have an adequate deterrent effect on the high school
and women drivers who are unemployed. A supplemental provi-
sion might well be an automatic revocation of the operator's lic-
ense for a period, determinate upon the nature of the infraction
and the number of past offenses. Such action has been taken in
other states and has met with success. 04
Although this idea of fortuity has apparently never been ex-
pressed by a court, inroads have been made on limiting those stat-
utes establishing punishment for the negligent driver. Thus, in the
recent case of Marshall v. State'0 5 the defendant was acquitted of a
manslaughter charge when he gave his car keys to a person he
knew to be drunk. The drunk had killed himself and another in a
highway collision. The court talked in terms of the "complicity"
of Marshall's conduct and came to the conclusion that he was not a
principle to the crime. Such was the court's way of stating that
it would be unfair to convict the defendant of such a crime. An-
other example of a judicial refusal to impose criminal sanctions
where the defendant was a victim of a fortuitous circumstance,
104 Connecticut has taken similar steps in traffic enforcement and such
a program has met with great success. The citizens at first com-
plained of the strict penalties and the ease with which their licenses
were suspended. The complaints stopped, however, when the sta-
tistics revealed that the annual fatality toll was reduced from 324 to
248 in only four years, notwithstanding an increase in the number
of vehicles using the highways.
105 362 Mich. 170, 106 N.W.2d 842 (1961).
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was Hubbard v. Commonwealth,'0 6 where the defendant had been
arrested for being drunk in a public place. Hubbard was ordered
to enter a jail cell but refused to do so peaceably. The exertion
of trying to get him inside the cell caused the jailer to suffer a heart
attack from which he died. In reversing the conviction, the court
talked in such terms as "proximate cause" and "intervening cause"
but the issue again was fairness. Just as these two courts realized
that it would be unfair to punish the defendants for results which
greatly exceeded their culpability, it is hoped that other jurisdic-
tions will adopt the proposals previously mentioned and cease the
imprisonment of the negligent motorist.
Unfortunately, all cases have not been decided in accord with
Marshall and Hubbard. Such an example is State v. Frazier,0 7
where the defendant dealt the deceased a slight blow not knowing
him to be a hemophiliac. The impact caused a slight laceration
on the inside of the deceased's mouth, which produced a hemor-
rhage, eventually resulting in death. The defendant was found
guilty and imprisoned! Convictions under circumstances compar-
able to the Frazier case are unjustified because of the unfairness
in the relationship between culpability and punishment, and also
because of the fortuitous nature of the wrong.
It is recognized that motor vehicle homicide and manslaughter
(when used to convict the negligent motorist) are not the only
crimes which may be classified as "fortuitous," but this writer is
of the opinion that they are the ones most in need of reform. A
good example of another fortuitous crime is the entire area of
attempt. To illustrate, suppose A and B (not acting in concert)
fire at C, each hoping to kill the intended victim. A proves to be
a better shot and kills C, whereas B's shot miscarries. Obviously
each is guilty of equal culpability, but the resulting punishment
will in no manner be the same. It should be noted, however, that
this situation is distinguishable from the motor vehicle homicide
area, in that the scheming killer should be given a last minute
chance to abandon his plans. If the punishments in the hypothet-
ical were to be equal, there would be no reason for B to stop firing
once his preparation reached the indictable stage of attempt.
Another example of "fortuity" which bears notation is the
crime of felony murder. 0 8 To illustrate, A and B each set out to
106 304 Ky. 818, 202 S.W.2d 634 (1947).
107 339 Mo. 966, 98 S.W.2d 707 (1936).
108 Under the "felony-murder" doctrine, when one person kills another
in perpetration of a common-law felony (or a specified felony which
is found in a statutory enumeration), the element of legal malice is
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rob separate business establishments. A's victim readily concedes
the cash, whereupon the felon flees unhampered by pursuit. B is
not as fortunate, as his intended victim brandishes a weapon, and
an ensuing scuffle results in the accidental killing of an innocent
bystander. Again the culpability is the same, the punishment
different, since B will face a murder charge. England has already
shown its attitude toward the unfairness involved in such a situa-
tion by abolishing this crime by the Homicide Act of 1957.109 The
felony-murder doctrine is firmly embedded in American jurispru-
dence and may be distinguished by the fact that society has a more
legitimate interest in holding the arsonist or rapist to the results
of his conduct.
CONCLUSION
It is time that the law makers of the various states accept a
realistic approach to the problem which the negligent driver pre-
sents. It is submitted that the best possible solution to the problem
is to de-emphasize the fact of a motor vehicle killing and instead
to enact laws calculated to put a stop to the causes of such killings.
Jack Barker, '63
supplied so as to make the resulting homicide murder. Common-
wealth v. Cater, 369 Pa. 172, 152 A.2d 259 (1959).
109 Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11 provides: "(1)Where a person
kills another in the course of furtherance of some other offense, the
killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice
aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to
amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance
of another offense. (2) For the purposes of the foregoing subsection,
a killing done in the course or for the purpose of resisting an officer
or justice, or of resisting or avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
or of effecting or assisting an escape or rescue from legal custody shall
be treated as killing in the course or furtherance of an offense."
